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In their Article, Saving Small-Employer Health Insurance, Amy Monahan and
Dan Schwarcz contend that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) could be the death of small-group health insurance by incentivizing many
small employers not to offer coverage. This article, like other work by Monahan
and Schwarcz, offers timely, insightful, and carefully written analysis of an
important social issue. While their prediction that the ACA, after implemented,
will destabilize the small-group insurance market may prove true, I argue why
their prescription that it should be saved is flawed and why we may be better off
without small group insurance.

 Assistant Professor, UCLA School of Law. Thank you to Michael Frakes, Mark Hall, Jill
Horwitz, Russell Korobkin, Timothy Jost, Bill Sage, and Daniel Schwarcz for comments on an earlier
draft of this article and to my editors at the Iowa Law Review for an invitation to write this
response.
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In their introduction, Monahan and Schwarcz write: “Of course, a skeptic may
reasonably wonder whether small-group insurance markets ought to be saved.”1
They then “proceed[] on the assumption that the ACA will not be able to
accomplish its broader goals as effectively if that market segment collapses.”2 But
one does not need to be a skeptic to wonder whether small-group insurance
markets ought to be saved. An optimist and an ACA supporter could argue that the
small-group markets need not be saved for the ACA to achieve its cornerstone goal
of ensuring affordable, high-quality coverage to more people. In fact, it might be
better to allow small-group health insurance to decline gradually, with more
employees moving over time to the ACA’s new individual-market exchanges
instead.3
The U.S. system of employer-based insurance is often described as a
historical accident that developed, in part, because employers enticed employees
with benefits packages when wage controls limited wage increases.4 Employerbased health insurance then became more prevalent because labor unions
advocated for health insurance as a benefit for workers.5 Favorable tax treatment of
employer-based coverage (health benefits are tax deductible for the employer and
excludable from income for the employee) has entrenched this system.6
But there is no inherent reason to preserve the small-group insurance market
(or employment-based insurance more generally, for that matter), in whole or in
part, unless it is an efficient and equitable means of coverage. Three markets for
health insurance exist in the U.S.: (1) large group for employers with more than 50
employees, (2) small-group for those with fewer than 50 employees, and (3)
individual-market insurance, where an individual buys insurance directly from an
insurer. While there are reasons why large-group insurance has worked well (albeit
not as efficiently or equitably as the non-employer based systems in other
countries, as noted below), the same has never been true for small-group insurance.
Furthermore, if the ACA works as intended, individual-market coverage, where
people will be able to buy insurance directly from the new exchanges, may be a

1. Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1935, 1941 (2013).
2. Id. They base this assumption on the fact that political challenges will arise if attempts to save
this market fail and on a belief that the stability of small-group market is more certain than that of the
individual-market exchanges because of existing tax benefits and infrastructure. Id.
3. I believe this vision is fully consistent with the design of the ACA, as discussed below.
4. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 309–10 (1982);
David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25–26 (2001).
5. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN
MOVEMENT 62–63 (2007).
6. Hyman & Hall, supra note 3, at 25.
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just as good or a better option than small-group insurance (or than employer-based
insurance more broadly) for many people.7
The bottom line: The primary goal of the ACA is to make high-quality
insurance affordable for more Americans. If the individual market exchanges
succeed, the ACA can achieve this goal even—or perhaps more so—in the absence
of small-group insurance. Thus, efforts to save small-group insurance are neither
necessary nor advisable, as a priority.
I.

THE PROBLEM (AS MONAHAN AND SCHWARCZ DESCRIBE IT)

Monahan and Schwarcz describe three major trends that could shrink the
small-group market and, in so doing, leave fewer people in the small-group
exchanges, known as the “Small Business Health Options Program” or SHOP
exchanges. If these exchanges are smaller—particularly if they suffer from adverse
selection, or sorting of less healthy employees into them—they will not pool risk
well and will struggle to offer affordable coverage.
The first two trends Monahan and Schwarcz predict result in employers
directing all or some of their employees, particularly the low-income ones, onto the
individual-market exchanges. First, they argue that the ACA discourages small
employers with lower-income employees from offering any employee coverage.8
Offering coverage could subject their employees to loss of eligibility for tax credits
that are available to low-income purchasers on the individual-market health
insurance exchanges but are not available to low-income employees insured
through an employer.9 Offering coverage might also subject employees, who
would otherwise be exempt, to the individual mandate.10 Monahan and Schwarcz
also suggest employers may feel less moral obligation to offer coverage if
employees can get good coverage on the individual exchanges, regardless of their
health, as the ACA’s individual-market exchanges intend to facilitate.11
Furthermore, the ACA does not require employers with fewer than 50 employees
to offer coverage;12 while it offers tax credits to some small businesses who choose

7. While not the focus of this article, I discuss herein many of the disadvantages of employerbased coverage and self-funded plans, which support arguments for a longer term phase out of
employer-based insurance altogether.
8. As Monahan and Schwarcz discuss, small employers have been less likely to offer coverage
historically, as compared to large employers, due to the higher per capita administrative costs of
coverage, the lack of in-house human resources expertise, and the challenges of risk pooling with small
groups. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1942–43.
9. Id. at 1951. Tax credits are available to anyone whose household income is between 100%
and 400% of the federal poverty level (“FPL”), as discussed below. See infra Part II.A.2.
10
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1953–54. An individual is subject to the individual mandate
only when she has access to affordable coverage and declines to purchase it. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119, 244–47 (2010) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2011)). Coverage is “affordable” for purposes of the mandate if it
is less than or equal to 8% of household income. ACA § 1501(b), I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1).
11. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1954.
12. ACA § 1513, I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2).
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to offer coverage, these credits are only available to some employers and only for a
limited duration.13 In light of these conditions, it may be rational for a small
employer with low-income employees not to offer coverage.
Second, Monahan and Schwarcz argue that the ACA enables small employers
to sort employees based on income or health so that the higher-income and healthy
choose employer-based coverage and others opt out. Employers with both higherand lower-income employees can design plans to create incentives for higherincome employees to enroll in the employer plan but lower-income employees to
opt instead for coverage through the individual-market exchanges. Employers
could do so by creating insurance plan options that are not “affordable” (premiums
exceed 9.5% of income) or do not provide “minimum value” (actuarial value of at
least 60%) for lower-income employees.14 Either of these conditions preserves the
employees’ access to tax credits for coverage on the individual-market exchanges15
and creates incentives for lower-income employees to buy individual coverage to
take advantage of these tax credits.16 In contrast, higher-income employees, who
are not eligible for tax credits on the exchange and who would benefit relatively
more from the tax exclusion of employer-based insurance, might nonetheless stick
with the employer plan.17 As Monahan and Schwarcz describe, employers who
take this approach avoid subsidizing employer-based coverage for low-income
employees, for whom beneficial tax treatment has little value, and can use any
dollars that would have funded health benefits to increase wages instead.18 But the
employer will still enjoy tax deductions for high-income employees who stick with
the employer health plan, which provides a less expensive way to compensate
these employees.19
In addition, if an employer sorts by offering a minimum-value plan, it subjects
an employee with high health spending to considerable cost-sharing. High-risk or
sick employees—whether high- or low-income—would also be more likely to
decline employer coverage and buy more comprehensive coverage on the
individual exchanges.20 In this case, employers would also reduce the number of
high-risk, expensive employees in their risk pools.
Finally, Monahan and Schwarcz predict—and others have examined in more
detail21—that the ACA is likely to cause more small employers to “self-insure,” or
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1954–55; see ACA § 1421, I.R.C. § 45R.
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1958–59.
ACA § 1401(a), I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C).
Id.
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1958–61.
See id. at 1960.
See id.
See id. at 1959–60.
See generally CHRISTINE EIBNER ET AL., RAND HEALTH, EMPLOYER SELF-INSURANCE
DECISIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AS
MODIFIED BY THE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 (ACA) (2011),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR971.html; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark
A. Hall, Self Insurance for Small Employers Under the Affordable Care Act: Federal and State
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retain liability for claims rather than transfer risk to an insurer.22 They highlight
several concerns with self-insurance, including that it enables employers to design
coverage that is not affordable or minimum value, which will exacerbate the
aforementioned sorting.23 In addition, employers with healthier, lower-cost
employee groups are more likely to self-insure, leaving less healthy groups in the
SHOP exchanges and making them more unstable.24 Finally, employers who selfinsure can avoid substantive health insurance regulations, including many of the
important consumer protection regulations of the ACA.25 While this last issue
poses reason for concern—and is a problem separate from and pre-dating the
ACA—I’ll argue that the other two consequences of self-insurance are not
necessarily problematic.
In short, Monahan and Schwarcz are concerned that some small employers
will send lower-income or less-healthy employees into the individual market and
that other small employers with healthy employee groups will self-insure,
extracting healthy employees from the SHOP exchanges. Both trends could
destabilize SHOP exchanges. I argue, however, that the first concern might be a
boon and the second is easily remedied within the parameters already set out in the
ACA.
II. WHY THESE TRENDS ARE LARGELY NOT A PROBLEM
Rather than lamenting the likely decline of small-group coverage, I argue that
its decline might be preferable in the long run, especially for lower-income or
higher-risk individuals.
A. WITH ACA SUCCESS, THERE IS NO LONGER A REASON TO PREFER SMALL-GROUP
COVERAGE OVER INDIVIDUAL-MARKET COVERAGE
Employer-based coverage is not inherently superior to other forms of
coverage; in fact in most countries, health care financing is not employer-based
and these countries enjoy better outcomes per dollar spent.26 However, in practice
in the U.S., employer-based insurance has historically been better than individualmarket coverage for three main reasons: (1) risk pooling, (2) tax benefits, and (3)

Regulatory Options, N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5–10), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070883.
22. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1967. Because most employers who self-insure obtain
stop-loss policies, in reality, they retain limited risk. Id. at 1970–72.
23. Id. at 1972–75.
24. EIBNER ET AL., supra note 21, at 61–63; Jost & Hall, supra note 21, at 8–10.
25. Self-insuring allows small employers to avoid the mandated benefit requirements (essential
health benefits), medical-loss ratios, premium review, and deductible limits. Monahan & Schwarcz,
supra note 1, at 1967.
26. OECD, OECD HEALTH DATA 2012: HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES COMPARE 1–2 (2012),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20130515051025/http://www.oecd.org/
unitedstates/BriefingNoteUSA2012.pdf (showing the U.S. health expenditures as the highest in the
world and describing some of the ways the U.S. lags on outcomes, including slower gains in life
expectancy than other countries and the highest rate of obesity among OECD countries).
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enhanced regulatory protections. None of these reasons is especially compelling
with regard to small groups after the implementation of the ACA, assuming the
individual-market reforms work reasonably well.
1.

Risk Pooling

A primary argument for employer-based health insurance is that employee
groups often offer perfect insurance risk pools.27 Employees come together in a
workplace for non-health related purposes, which usually leads to a diverse health
makeup among members and, in turn, predictable and stable average per capita
health care costs year-to-year.
While this benefit accrues to most large employee groups, it is less true for
small groups, where one very sick person can lead to extremely high costs for the
group. Because federal law prevents employers from excluding employees from
coverage based on health status and because they are not able to charge a risky
individual more for coverage,28 having a single sick employee can have a strong
effect on the composition of the risk pool and, historically, on premiums for all
employees.29 Thus, the main argument for preserving employer-based coverage
never applied to small groups.
Even in light of ACA regulations that will improve risk pooling by
eliminating most underwriting for small groups,30 it is not clear that small group
markets will have any significant risk-pooling advantage over the individual
market.31 The individual market exchange pools will be quite large with 22 million
expected insured by 2019.32 In addition, the “individual mandate” is intended to

27. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 571, 573–74 (2008).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
29. See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1943.
30. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 156 (2010) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 300gg (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (adding § 2701 to the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”)).
31. Empirically, it is difficult to predict which market will result in a better risk pool for several
reasons. First, the ACA’s rules for risk pooling among those insured inside and outside exchanges are
complex. While an insurer participating in an exchange must treat all insured, whether inside or outside
the exchange, as one risk pool, some insurers might not participate in the exchanges and grandfathered
plans are not included in this requirement, thus fragmenting risk pooling in both the individual and
small-group markets. See NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, ADVERSE SELECTION ISSUES AND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2 (2011).
32. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S FEBRUARY 2013 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 3 (2013), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900_ACAInsuranceCoverageEffects.pdf.
The individual and small-group markets are estimated to be roughly similar in size overall. Id. at 2. In
2023, an estimated 28 million individuals under age 65 will have nongroup (i.e. individual) or “other”
coverage outside of exchanges—a significant portion of whom with “other” coverage—which refers to
Medicare. Id. An estimated 25 million will have individual-market exchange coverage, which means
more than 30 million will have individual-market coverage. Id. 167 million will have employer
coverage—just over 18% of whom with small-group coverage—making over 30 million small-group
insured. Id.; THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 16 (2012) [hereinafter “KAISER & HRET SURVEY”], available at

HOFFMAN_BULLETIN_10.14.2013_FINAL VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

AN OPTIMIST’S TAKE

10/14/2013 2:51 PM

119

combat adverse selection by encouraging healthy people to buy coverage.33 If the
mandate is successful,34 the individual market may thus pool risk and stabilize
health care premiums as well as or better than the small-group market.
2.

Tax Benefits

Tax excludability is a second advantage of employment-based coverage over
individual coverage. Employer-sponsored health insurance can be financed with
pre-tax income,35 whereas individual coverage can only be purchased with aftertax dollars.
But tax excludability is not necessarily a good thing. In fact, leading into the
ACA debates, economists of all political persuasions were in large agreement that
the tax treatment of employer-sponsored insurance is a problem and should be
limited or eliminated.36 The exclusion of health benefits is regressive; higherincome employees benefit more when income is excluded from taxes because they
are being taxed at higher rates. Exclusion is also inefficient because it causes too
much investment into health benefits instead of wages, by making the former
relatively cheaper.37 By one estimate, for the typical worker, health benefits cost
65% of wages or other goods purchased; in essence a dollar of health benefits costs
only 65 cents.38 In turn, comprehensive insurance coverage might prompt people to

http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.
files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (estimating
that 18.3% of covered workers are in small groups with 49 or fewer employees, which would mean 30.5
million workers with small-group coverage—18.3% of 167 million—in 2023 if this percentage remains
constant). While the individual market pools may be small enough in some states that risk-pooling may
be imperfect, the potential SHOP exchange pool will be even smaller in those states. CBO estimates
about one-fifth as many people will have employer-based coverage on exchanges as will have
individually purchased coverage on exchanges. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra.
33. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–44 (2010) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. V 2011)).
34. Some believe individual mandate penalties are not high enough to provoke young, healthy
people to get coverage, which would undermine individual-market risk pooling. However, evidence
from Massachusetts’ 2006 reform, which also had relatively low penalties for non-compliance, showed
high rates of participation. Amitabh Chandra et al., The Importance of the Individual Mandate—
Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 295 (2011).
35. I.R.C. §§ 106, 125 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The ACA explicitly allows employees to buy
coverage on the SHOP exchanges with pre-tax dollars as a cafeteria plan benefit. ACA § 1421, I.R.C. §
45R (Supp. V 2011). But individual coverage still must be purchased with post-tax dollars.
36. E.g., CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 141 (2009), available at
http://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policymakers-7th-edition-2009; Paul N.
Van de Water, Limiting the Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Insurance Can Help Pay for Health
Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 1 (June 4, 2009), http://www.cbpp.org/
files/6-2-09health.pdf.
37. See, e.g., Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON.
251, 255 (1973) (explaining how tax subsidies of employer-based insurance create overinsurance);
Gruber, supra note 27, at 574, 580.
38. Gruber, supra note 27, at 574. In addition, employees can receive tax subsidies for money
spent on health insurance purchased with money in a “cafeteria plan,” as defined under section 125 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
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overuse care if they bear little or no cost sharing (deductibles, co-payments, or coinsurance) for items or services at the time of consumption, a problem known as
moral hazard.39
In contrast, subsidies of health care benefits available on the individualmarket exchanges are a more equitable use of tax dollars. The tax credits are set on
a sliding scale with the amount of subsidy decreasing as income increases. Any
individual with household income between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty
level (“FPL”) will pay no more than a predetermined percentage of income on
insurance premiums for an exchange plan, ranging from 2% of income for
someone earning 100% of the FPL to 9.5% of income for someone earning 300%
to 400% of the FPL.40 The amount of a tax credit is calculated based on the
premium for the second most expensive “silver-level” plan in a state minus the
predetermined contribution.41 In addition, the ACA provides cost-sharing subsidies
that limit how much an individual earning up to 400% of the FPL, who buys silverlevel coverage on an exchange, spends out-of-pocket when using medical care.42
These tax policies have the exact opposite effect as the current tax exclusion:
rather than offering greater benefit for higher-income earners, for whom
excludability is more valuable, they offer greater benefit the less an individual
earns. The new status quo is not perfectly progressive. Some small-group
employees will either lose or opt out of employer coverage and yet qualify for
little, or no, exchange subsidies if they earn close to or over 400% of the FPL.
These employees will be worse off than similarly-situated individuals with
employer-sponsored health insurance, who benefit from the tax exclusion. Their
circumstance, however, is less a critique of the ACA’s tax policies and more
grounds for additional critique of the inequities created by allowing purchase of
health benefits with pre-tax dollars for employer-sponsored insurance. In addition,
while inequitable, most of these individuals are arguably in a reasonable position
to finance their own health insurance coverage, even without the benefit of tax
subsidies.
In addition to being more equitable, the tax credits are more efficient because
they are less likely than the status quo tax exclusion to create moral hazard—
although they might still to a lesser degree. Because the tax credits are calculated
based on the premium for a silver-level plan, it is unlikely an individual with
income low enough to qualify for the tax credits would buy any higher than a
silver level plan (i.e. “gold” or “platinum” coverage). They might, in fact, use their
subsidy to buy a less expensive “bronze” plan. Individuals with silver or bronze
plans incur cost-sharing when they use medical care, which could reduce such use
39. See generally Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 531 (1968). Cost sharing, including copayments and deductibles, decreases moral hazard. See
GRUBER, infra note 40 at 5.
40. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(a), 124 Stat. 119, 213–19 (2010) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 36B(b) (Supp. V 2011)).
41. See id.
42. ACA § 1402(b)–(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (Supp. V 2011).
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overall43 (it might, however, deter poor insured from seeking necessary care44).
Admittedly, the cost-sharing subsidies could counterbalance this effect, rendering
even individuals with silver plans less sensitive to health care spending at the point
of use; but these subsidies only lessen and do not eliminate cost-sharing.
Thus, shifting away from small-group and toward individual-market coverage
is more equitable and efficient from a tax policy perspective.45
3.

Regulatory Protections

Another former advantage of employer-based coverage over individualmarket coverage that the ACA equalizes is consumer protections. The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) prohibited
employers from discriminating against employees based on health status,46 limited
exclusion of coverage for preexisting conditions,47 and required insurers to issue
coverage to any applicant (i.e. “guaranteed issuance”).48 These regulations meant
that every employer could get access to coverage for its employees, regardless of
the group’s health status—albeit, sometimes at a high price—and every employee
had access to the employer’s plan at a community-rated price that included all
benefits offered under the employer’s plan.
Before the ACA, these regulations applied only to group coverage, for the
most part, resulting in an individual market that was notorious for excluding highrisk applicants. By one estimate, in 2005, nearly three in five adults who applied
for coverage in the individual market “found it very difficult or impossible” to find
a plan that they could afford because they were denied coverage, charged higher
prices, or had a health problem excluded from coverage.49
43. JONATHAN GRUBER, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR
HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND 9 (2006),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7566.pdf (discussing various studies revealing
information about elasticity of demand for various medical treatments).
44. Id. at 5 (describing the results from the RAND health experiment showing that with cost
sharing some individuals will forgo care, even when this forbearance is not in their best interests).
45. This line of thinking equally argues for unraveling large-group coverage as well over time, or
at least for eliminating the preferential tax treatment of such coverage.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) (“[p]rohibiting discrimination against individual participants and
beneficiaries based on health status”). While the terms might be facially neutral, however, employers
could still exclude whole categories of treatment in a way that might have a disparate impact on
employees. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403, 408 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that an employer who reduced the medical benefits for employees with AIDS did not discriminate
illegally).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1181.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2006). This provision existed in a different form prior to the passage of
the ACA and was modified by the ACA to apply to both group and individual coverage.
49. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SQUEEZED: WHY RISING EXPOSURE TO
HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 4
(2006),
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%
20Report/2006/Sep/Squeezed%20%20Why%20Rising%20Exposure%20to%20Health%20Care%20Costs%2
0Threatens%20the%20Health%20and%20Financial%20Well%20Being%20of/Collins_squeezedrisinghltcare
costs_953%20pdf.pdf.
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The ACA, however, evens the playing field by extending the protections
historically in the group markets to the individual market as well. The ACA
requires insurers to guarantee coverage to all applicants,50 prohibits the exclusion
of pre-existing conditions,51 and prohibits “risk-rating” or charging people more
based on health status.52 In fact, there are only four factors for which an insurer
may charge an individual more for a policy: geography, family size, age, and
tobacco-use status.53 Furthermore, the ACA requires insurers offering policies on
the individual-market exchanges to include a comprehensive set of “essential
health benefits.”54
The ACA regulations intend that an individual—even if in poor health—will
be able to get quality coverage on the individual-market exchanges, with
comprehensive benefits, including for any pre-existing conditions, at modified
community-rated prices. The effect is that high-risk individuals might be just as
well or better off with individual-market coverage than with group coverage.
4.

Lingering Downsides of Employer-Based Coverage

Employer-based coverage has historically also had many disadvantages,
which will remain after the ACA.55 In light of these lingering downsides, if the
individual market is successful, it might be preferable to transition all employerbased coverage (both small- and large-group) to individual-market coverage over
time.
For example, getting health care benefits from an employer introduces
personal health matters into the workplace, where employers might have access to
sensitive and private health data. While this access does offer the potential for
employers to put initiatives in place to improve employee health, it has significant
risks. Because having sick employees will increase the costs of an employer plan
and of doing business, employers have an incentive to avoid and discriminate
against sicker job applicants. Even though laws have attempted to prevent
discrimination based on an individual’s health,56 they are largely considered
ineffective because an employer can typically offer other nondiscriminatory
reasons for not hiring an individual who might pose a risk of health care
spending.57
50. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 156 (2010) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (adding § 2702 to the PHSA).
51. ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (adding § 2704(a) to the PHSA).
52. Id. § 300gg-4 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA).
53. Id. § 300gg (adding § 2701 to the PHSA).
54. ACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA).
55. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: A Balance Sheet, HEALTH
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 124, 124.
56. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 101,
122 Stat. 881, 883–88 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (banning the use
of genetic information when setting insurance rates for group health plans).
57. See Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways To Cut
Employee Benefit Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/
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In addition, employer-based insurance is not portable. This means that when
an individual leaves a job, she cannot take her insurance with her, causing
disruptions in coverage and often requiring individuals to change their care
providers.58 While the law has attempted to ameliorate gaps in coverage through
“COBRA” continuation coverage,59 which allows an employee to maintain
employer-sponsored coverage for 18 months after leaving employment, this option
is rarely used because the employee must pay the entire cost of, typically
expensive, coverage.60
For larger groups, administrative cost efficiency and negotiating power have
been an advantage, but small groups, in particular, have a difficult time arranging
for and administering health benefits. They sometimes lack an individual to
manage benefits effectively in house and have experienced plan administrative
costs many times higher than large-group plans.61 While the SHOP exchanges will
bolster negotiating power and might reduce some administrative costs, they will
not eliminate the internal costs and challenges of managing the provision of
employee benefits, which employers often claim feels like a second line of
business.
In sum, if the individual-market exchanges succeed, the shift away from
small-group insurance and into individual-market plans could be beneficial,
considering that small-group coverage offers little or no comparative advantages
over individual coverage and that there are significant disadvantages with
employers as a locus for health insurance.
B. THE POST-ACA INDIVIDUAL MARKET IS BETTER, IN PARTICULAR, FOR LOWERINCOME OR HIGHER-RISK EMPLOYEES
Monahan and Schwarcz voice concern about employers funneling lowerincome or higher-risk (or less healthy) individuals, in particular, into the
individual-market exchanges, but this trend might also be beneficial. The
exchanges are arguably better places for these individuals to find good access to
affordable health care without unduly burdening small employers.
business/26walmart.ready.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing the type of pretext used to screen out
less healthy employees including Wal-Mart’s requirement that “all jobs . . . include some physical
activity (e.g., all cashiers do some cart-gathering)” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
58. It is possible that SHOP exchanges could increase portability to some degree if they have a
defined-contribution model option, where employees can choose from any available plan. In this case, if
an employee moves from one small employer to another, both of which have defined–benefit SHOP
coverage, the employee could maintain coverage. But the chance that an employee moves to another
employer with defined-benefit SHOP coverage is small and portability will still be limited if the
employee moves to a large group plan or, likely also, to individual coverage.
59. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, Title X, §
10002(a) (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq.).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3) (2006).
61. STACEY MCMORROW ET AL., URBAN INST., THE EFFECTS OF HEALTH REFORM ON SMALL
BUSINESSES AND THEIR WORKERS: TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 2
(2011), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412349-Effects-of-Health-Reform-on-SmallBusinesses.pdf.
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As Monahan and Schwarcz themselves describe, with tax credits and costsharing subsidies, a low-income individual will be better off getting coverage
through the individual-market exchange than through an employer.62 The
individual will in most cases pay less out-of-pocket for individual-market coverage
than he would if he were to try to get the same plan through his employer.63 The
example that Monahan and Schwarcz provide is that someone who earns 200% of
the FPL, might pay only $704 for a bronze health plan on the exchange or $1386
for silver-level coverage (based on a premium of $4780 for silver level coverage
and $3394 tax credit). Most individuals pay more than that amount for the
employee share of premiums for a small-group employer plan; the average
employee contribution in the U.S. in 2012 for small-group family coverage was
$5134 and for single coverage was $848.64 Furthermore, for these employees, the
employer is paying part of the cost of benefits. As noted above, this spending
substitutes wage spending, which means the total cost to the employee is greater
than just this premium contribution.65 Even though employees cannot pay for
premiums with pre-tax dollars on an individual-market exchange, the exchange tax
credit and the cost-sharing subsidies along with any wage benefit would outweigh
the low value of the tax exclusion for someone with little taxable wages.66
Monahan and Schwarcz lament the expense of additional people taking
advantage of individual-market tax credits.67 However, this additional spending is
squarely, progressively, and efficiently focused on helping the ACA achieve its
goals. In the exchanges, the cost of subsidizing poor and sick people is shared and
spread more broadly among all taxpayers and ACA revenue sources, rather than
resting on the shoulders of small employers, who might bend under the weight.
Allowing these small employers to send employees to the individual-market
exchanges meets the dual goals of ensuring employees high-quality, affordable
coverage and preserving employment and wages for lower-income workers.
Someone will have to subsidize these employees’ coverage, and it is not clear that
we should place this burden on small employers or their employees, rather than on
the public fisc, even if politically easier.
While greater reliance on the individual market is more solidaristic in terms of
broad risk-spreading, a two-tiered system might develop with the healthy and
wealthy in employer plans and the sick and poor in exchange plans. On one hand,
this means that the two groups are not directly pooling health risks and that those
in the small-group market get away without having to subsidize less-healthy

62. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1953.
63. See id.
64. KAISER & HRET SURVEY, supra note 32, at 72.
65. Economic theory suggests that dollars not spent on health benefits translate into additional
wages. See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of Equalizing Differences, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 641 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986); Lawrence H. Summers, Some
Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1989).
66. See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1952–53.
67. Id. at 1963–64.
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coworkers’ coverage.68 On the other hand, the increased costs of coverage in the
individual-market exchanges, if they suffer from adverse selection, will fall on
higher-income taxpayers, not on low-income individually-insured, whose
contributions are capped as a percentage of income under the ACA, as discussed
above. Thus, the wealthy in employer plans do not fully escape subsidizing the
costs of the poor and the sick because they will help finance increased tax credits
through progressive tax mechanisms.69 In addition, the ACA’s substantive
regulations bring the quality of individual-market coverage in line with employer
plans. This means that even if a two-tiered system develops, those with individual
coverage will not suffer from lesser or more expensive insurance than those in
employer plans.
Thus, while having more low-income people in exchanges would increase the
bottom-line costs of the ACA and pressures on the federal budget, this end strikes
me as an especially worthwhile use of government spending. Plus, spending to
ensure financial protection and access to health care for low-income Americans is
less vulnerable politically; it is relatively more difficult for detractors of the ACA
to attack spending on necessary health care for poor people (although certainly not
unimaginable).
C. THE SUCCESS OF THE ACA DOES NOT RELY ON THE SURVIVAL OF SMALL-GROUP
MARKETS OR SHOP EXCHANGES
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even if the trends described above
make it difficult for the SHOP exchanges to stand on their own, this effect would
not threaten the ACA’s success. Both the shifting of employees to the individual
market, as discussed above, and the increase in self-insurance could threaten the
survival of the small-group market by depleting small-group risk pools and, in
particular, by removing healthier members into self-insured plans. Monahan and
Schwarcz attempt to defend the goal of saving small-group markets by suggesting
that the ACA’s goal was to bolster small-group markets, based on the fact that the
structure of the ACA presumes the existence of small-group market and
exchanges.70
I think it is less clear than Monahan and Schwarcz suggest, however, that the
ACA intended to save the small-group market in the long run. Employer-sponsored
insurance has been slowly eroding over the past decades.71 While ACA provisions
definitely acknowledge the continuation of small groups, especially in the short

68. Of course, if those employees are buying in the SHOP exchanges, where group premiums will
not vary based on health, costs will be spread among all small-group SHOP insured in a state, not just
among coworkers.
69. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10906, 124 Stat. 119, 1020 (2010) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §1401 (Supp. V 2011)).
70. Id. at 1941.
71. KAISER & HRET SURVEY, supra note 32, at 5 (showing a decline in the offer rate of health
benefits from 66% of all firms in 1999 to 61% in 2012, with some variability up and down in
intermediate years).
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term—including the subsidization of small-group coverage in the short term and
the creation of SHOP exchanges—other parts of the ACA suggest that the drafters
might have foreseen or accepted shrinking small-group insurance markets in the
longer-term.72 For example, the ACA’s imposition of financial penalties on
employers that fail to provide employees coverage does not extend to small
employers; if a key goal were to preserve this market, extending these penalties to
all employers would have gone a long way. While a mandate for small employers
would have been a political battle, it was one that legislators took on against large
employers. Furthermore, the ACA’s efforts to fix the problems with the individual
market could be seen as creating a gateway to allow evolution away from
employer-based insurance, especially for small employers, for whom offering
insurance may not be rational. If the individual-market exchanges work,
individuals will have access to high-quality, affordable, and portable coverage
outside the workplace.
Finally, the law explicitly permits states to create a merged market for
individual- and small-group insurance, rather than setting up a separate
infrastructure for SHOP exchanges,73 as has been done successfully in
Massachusetts as part of its 2006 health reform. To the extent the small-group
market is depleted in numbers, especially if part of that depletion occurs through a
funneling of employees to the individual market, the balance is easily regained by
merging the two markets. The fact that the law explicitly authorizes such a merger
could be recognition by its drafters that in some states the small-group market
would be too small to stand on its own and that the markets would function better
together, rather than separately. Monahan and Schwarcz recognize this possibility
but, in my opinion, fail to give it enough credit. Admittedly, this merger of markets
would not neutralize adverse selection due to self-insurance, but it would
ameliorate the other concerns that Monahan and Schwarcz outline.
Even if the drafters of the law did intend to save the small-group market, if it
becomes apparent during implementation that the ACA’s goals can be achieved as
well without it, there is no reason to double down efforts on saving a dying market,
while other hard work awaits. The administration may already be thinking along
these lines, as evinced by its decision to abandon full implementation of the SHOP
exchanges this year when it became clear that it would have to triage to meet
priority ACA deadlines, including that for establishing the individual-market
exchanges.74 While detractors of the law may attempt to spin weakness of SHOP

72. Other parts, such as the “Cadillac Tax” and its gradual elimination of tax exclusion of
employer-sponsored health care, can be read as discouraging employer-sponsored coverage, including
large-group coverage, in the long-term. See, e.g., Austin Frakt, The Decline of Employer-Sponsored
Coverage Under Health Reform: Good, Bad, or Ugly?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (2010), available at
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2010/May/052710Frakt.aspx.
73. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1312(c)(3), 124 Stat. 119, 182 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
18032(c)(3) (Supp. V 2011)).
74. Robert Pear, Small Firms’ Offer of Plan Choices Under Health Law Delayed, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2013).
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exchanges as an ACA failure, this risk is political (not technical) and could be
managed through a successful public relations campaign, rather than by trying to
bolster an unnecessary SHOP exchange just for positive publicity. Monahan and
Schwarcz suggest that failed attempts to preserve the small-group markets could
pose political challenges to the ACA. This is true and argues for the alternative of
slowing letting them slip away and cutting losses early. Assuming those who lose
access to small-group coverage have good options in the individual market,
detractors would be pressed to frame this decline of small-group coverage as a
significant failure
III. SELF-INSURANCE IS A PROBLEM—BEYOND THE ACA AND SMALL GROUPS
Finally, while the authors do flag some genuine concerns with small
employers increasingly self-insuring, the gravest concerns with regard to selfinsuring are neither products of the ACA nor are they unique to small-group
markets. The authors’ novel contribution in this article with regard to self
insurance is the insight that it facilitates employers’ ability to design plans that
encourage lower-income employees to seek coverage on the individual market. As
already discussed, this consequence may actually provide beneficial effects
overall.
That being said, the other consequences of self-insuring that they mention
briefly, and that have been examined elsewhere,75 are genuine concerns and are
relevant with regard to small- and large-group plans. These are the risks that selfinsurance creates for adverse selection against fully-insured markets (small and
large) with resulting harm to risk pools. More importantly, self-insured employers
can avoid substantive insurance regulation because of the shield provided by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).76 ERISA allows
employers to retain control over the content of their employee health plans, unless
federal regulation demands otherwise. While federal laws have mandated a few
substantive coverage requirements for self-insured plans, employers who selfinsure have almost complete leeway over the design of their health plans. The
ACA perpetuates this self-insured group favoritism (likely for political reasons)
and exempts self-insured plans from many of the ACA federal regulatory
provisions that bolster substantive requirements.
Monahan and Schwarcz outline several solutions to this problem with respect
to small-group markets, some of which are being adopted by states: reform of stoploss insurance to make it more difficult for a small employer to self-insure,
designing SHOP exchanges to be more attractive than self-insurance, and creating
incentives for brokers to promote SHOP coverage instead of self-insuring.77 A
75. See, e.g., Jost & Hall, supra note 21, at 8–10; Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal
Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
1361, 1370.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that an employee benefits plan may not be “deemed
to be an insurance company or other insurer” and thus is exempt from state insurance regulations).
77. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1975–89.
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better option would have been not to exempt self-insured plans—large and small—
from substantive regulations of the ACA in the first place. If the goal of health
reform is to ensure that all Americans have meaningful coverage, the increasing
frequency of self-insured plans could in fact undermine its success. Yet, this
problem reaches beyond small-group markets and will remain whether small-group
markets do or not.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, saving small-employer health insurance is not necessary to ensure the
ACA’s success if the individual-market exchanges work as envisioned. This if is
significant. To the extent that the exchanges falter and the individual market
remains the weakest link of the U.S. health insurance system, the death of smallemployer health insurance might pose real reason for concern. But the likelihood
that SHOP exchanges would work and prove superior to individual-markets
exchanges after the ACA is implemented is small. Thus, I’m inclined to take a
wait-and-see approach, rather than sound the alarms, and to focus implementation
efforts on more critical concerns.

